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GENERAL MOVEMENTS, 1922-1929
Introduction
BEFORE the advent of the current type ol statistical
analysis, theories of business fluctuations ran in terms
of a period of about ten years. The more recent
methods have revealed cycles which, in this country,
have an average length about one-third as great,
though with considerable variation from cycle to
cycle, ranging from about two to five years. One
reason for this change may be that the older methods
of observation revealed only the more obvious and
spectacular movements, commonly accompanied by
great waves of speculation and a widespread break-
down of the banking system, while the more deli-
cate statistical analysis now available reveals more
basic industrial fluctuations which do not always
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produce such spectacular symptoms, visible to the
man in the street. On the other hand, there have
been changes in the character of business cycles
themselves. And it may well be that factors having
relatively short natural periods have been increas-
ing in importance as compared to others whose nat-
ural periods are longer. If so, traces should still be
visible of these more slowly acting forces. And some
present-day students still consider that there is evi-
dence pointing to the existence of longer cycles,
combined with the shorter ones. Thus it is particu-
larly pertinent to examine the movements over
longer periods.
In doing this for the post-War years the writer
was much assisted by material presented by Professor
F. C. Mills in Economic Tendencies in the United
States,' covering the period 1899-1929, with em-
phasis on the last eight years. The organized series
of the National Bureau of Economic Research were
also a main reliance. While still provisional as to
the length of the recession beginning in 1929, they
give an adequate picture of the decade 1921-31,
covering almost the whole of three short cycles.
In this analysis it seems significant that this entire
three-cycle period exhibits a surprising number
(though not all) of the features that characterize the
typical single cycle. In most series it shows two cycles
1(NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1932),astudy sponsored
by the Committee on Recent Economic Changes.
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with large rises and small declines followed by one
cycle with a small rise and large decline. In con-
struction, as already noted, there is a practically
uninterrupted rise during the whole of the first two
cycles and a practically uninterrupted decline dur-
ing the greater part of the last cycle. For this decline,
residential construction is responsible.
The Stock Market
In stock exchange speculation the striking feature
is not a repetition of three similar cycles, but succes-
sively rising waves culminating in a veritable mania.
This, in connection with the intervals that have
separated comparable fevers in the past, suggests
strongly that there are psychological elements in this
phase of business which have a longer natural period
than some of the other elements, such as those con-
nected with the time concentrations of expansion of
capital equipment. One cycle of three years and four
months appears to be too short for the working up
of one of these more extreme forms of market brain-
storm, including the process of forgetting the lessons
supposedly learned from earlier experiences of the
same sort. A 'new era'—or a new era psychology—
cannot be successfully launched in three years.
Another line of explanation of the stock market
boom is based upon the quantity of free funds seek-
ing investment and constituting the demand for
securities, relative to the supply. Expressed in an
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extreme form, this explanation states that the boom
was simply due to the unprecedented quantity of
savings seeking investment that accumulated in the
prosperous period of 192 2-29. According to this
view, a rise in prices was a mathematical necessity,
since the supply of securities into which these funds
might flow, though large, was still limited. There
can be little doubt that savings during this period
were an increasing proportion, and probably an
unprecedentedly large proportion, of an unprece-
dentedly large national dividend. A contributing
factor, whose importance cannot be measured, was
the retirement of the Federal war debt at a rate of
over $8oo,ooo,ooo a year, tending to increase the
volume of free funds seeking re-investment. This
fully neutralized the increase in state and local debts
during the same period, and left free for private
investment funds which would otherwise have been
absorbed by increased issues of state and local bonds.
Cheap money rates and the expansion of bank credit
strengthened the movement, and are thought by
some to have been the initiating and determining
factor. The total was sufficient to finance a large ex-
port of capital and an enormous increase in our
domestic capital equipment, and to leave something
over for sheer speculative inflation of security values.
The effect of such a surplus of savings, if we as-
sume that it existed, constitutes an interesting theo-
retical problem. A buys securities from B, and B
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spends the money either for other securities• or for
goods for consumption. It is reasonable to suppose
that the funds circulate from investor to investor
until the entire amount is spent, either by corpora-
tions for industrial capital or by one person or an-
other for consumption purposes, or at least for goods
other than stock market securities. Meanwhile, each
purchase of securities has tended to enhance their
prices. It can easily be conceived that in a period
characterized by only mild recessions, for example,
1922-29, such a process would go on cumulatively,
requiring several short cycles to reach its limits at
the point where prospective incomes were capital-
ized at such extravagant rates that a reaction became
inevitable. According to this explanation of the
boom, the irrational values set on future yields were
not the results of an original speculative mania;
rather the apparent mania was the result of an over-
supply of funds seeking investment. Between these
two rival explanations statistics afford no way of
choosing which element was of more importance as
an originating cause. Both. were present, each re-
acted on the other, and the natural conclusion is
that both were jointly responsible for the result.
Such a boom destroys one corrective for a lack of
equilibrium in the economic order, on which eco-
nomic theorists have relied in their descriptions of
astaticstate. According to these theories, when
there is an over-supply of investment funds, yields
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should decline and this should reduce the incentive
to further saving and investment. But these same
low yields, taking shape as they do in ever increasing
prices of existing securities, give rise to enormous
speculative profits to the holders, quite apart from
the earnings of the industrial properties which the
securities represent. Thus the stimulus to increased
purchase of securities, instead of being self-limiting,
becomes cumulative within limits which the recent
boom showed to be surprisingly wide.
Construction
With respect to construction, it seems probable
that the principal factor in the early stages of the
post-War boom was the shortage inherited from the
World War. This was presumably larger than the
aftermath of a typical short-cycle depression—ac-
curate comparative measures are unfortunately lack-
ing—and the work of making it good took longer to
get under way, partly on account of post-War re-
strictions on rentals. Thus, once started, it persisted
beyond the limits of one general business cycle, and
acquired a momentum which invited speculative
activity, and this in turn carried construction to the
point of what appears to have been a rather unusu-
ally large over-supply, at least in certain fields. This
may well have been a strong factor in the rising
trend of the two cycles of 192 '-24 and 1924-27,with
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effects which returned to help sustain the building
boom itself.
A factor which undoubtedly assisted very greatly,
and one which tied construction to the stock market
to an increased extent, was the shift to the corporate
form of financing, bringing withitbroadened
sources of funds and also the opportunity for con-
struction motivated by profits of promotion rather
than by expectation of returns from rentals. One
general hypothesis suggested by this experience is
that, in the field of durable goods, the duration of
the rebound of any one considerable type of business
may be a function of the extent to which the supply
in existence has been limited as a result of the pre-
ceding depression or dislocation. For that reason
different branches of production may have longer or
shorter revival movements during any one revival
of general business.
Banking
Bank loans(loans of Federal Reserve member
banks) behave similarly to construction in that be-
tween 1922 and 1931 there is only one actual cycli-
cal decline: the one beginning in November, 1929.
In this field, however, this form of behavior is typical
of previous experience. Bank loans have, since 1879,
shown a strong secular uptrend and only a moderate
cyclical movement, with the result that, on the aver-
age, the effect of a general business recessionis
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approximately cancelled by the secular uptrend. In
the average cycle pattern, bank loans rise strongly
during the up-swing of general business and remain
approximately stable during the down-swing. The
period 1879-1908 includes eight general business
cycles, but in only four of these do bank loans show
any positive decline. These facts, as far as they go,
suggest the existence of longer rhythms than those
of the short cycle; or they may suggest a classifica-
tion of cycles into major ones, which are serious
enough to bring about a positive decline in bank
loans, and lesser ones which are not.
Fixed Capital
Another striking feature of the period '922-29
was a strong upward movement in the proportion
of fixed capital to labor not only in industry but
also in agriculture. Since adequate measures are
lacking, it is not possible to make a fully conclusive
comparison of the rate at which this change was
going on during the post-War period and earlier
periods, but its importance in the later period seems
outstanding, and it was proceeding at an accelerat-
ing rate, as witnessed by the fact that the rate of
growth in production of capital equipment was far
greater than that of goods in general,2 and greater
also than in the pre-War period, 1899-1913. This
movement was so pronounced as to create a sus-
2SeeF. C. Mills, cit., pp. 22,280-1, 284.
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picion that it was a concentration of growth rather
than a true secular trend, and was greater than could
be permanently maintained and absorbed, at least
by our business system as it now operates.
This is corroborated by evidences of growing ex-
cess productive capacity in numerous industries. The
evidence is overwhelming in some instances, though
no adequate measure of real excess capacity exists.
Figures of theoretical capacity as commonly given
are subject to heavy deductions for the purpose in
hand.3 As to whether capital funds are really in-
creasing faster than industry in general can absorb
them, or are merely misdirected, there can hardly
be any séientifically conclusive test; and it is espe-
cially difficult to see how the question could have
been answered while the growth was going on.
The answer hinges not only on the increase in
capital, but also on the effect it has had in increasing
the productiveness of industry. And these later accre-
tions of capital seem to have been more effective
than those of preceding periods in increasing physi-
cal output. Professor Mills' figures indicate that the
country's physical output increased faster from 1922
to 1929thanduring the fourteen years preceding
the World War, while the period from to '922
witnessed a still smaller increase.4 In manufacturing,
the period of post-War prosperity clearly shows a
-3 Thispoint will be amplified in Part v, see pp. 150-1.
4 SeeEconomic Tendencies in the United States, pp. iSg,284.
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higher rate of increase in product per worker, though
the number of workers was increasing more slowly.
As to the relation of output to fixed capital, one
attempt has been made to measure this ratio for the
years 1899 to The conclusion was that while
product per worker increased, capital per worker
increased from three to four times as much. In the
period of post-War prosperity, the indications are
that product much more nearly kept pace with cap-
ital; indeed, with economies in working capital, it
is not certain that total capital has increased faster
than product.
The 'law of diminishing productivity' would lead
us to expect that product would increase at a rate
intermediate between the increase of labor and that
of capital. If it increased as fast as capital, that would
mean that technical progress had entirely neutralized
the effects of the principle of diminishing produc-
tivity, and in the long run that is probably too much
to expect. Thus on a priori grounds one may con-
clude that in all probability product, relative to labor
and capital, was increasing during the post-War
period at a higher rate than one would expect to be
maintained as a long-run normal rate of increase.
Such conclusions, however, can never be more than
provisional.
5SeeC. W. Cobb and Paul H. Douglas's A Theory of Productivity,
American Economic Review Supplement, March, 1928, pp. 139-65.The
study includes the construction ot an index number of fixed capital.
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Corporate Net Incomes
During the period 192 2-29, profits as represented
by corporate net incomes, increased faster than
wages. In manufacturing, net incomes increased at
an annual rate of 5.3 per cent, per capita earnings
of wage earners at the rate of 1.6 per cent, and num-
ber of factory workers at i per cent.6 The conclusion
seems clear that there was an increase in the pro-
portion of total income going to profits (including
those left in the business) and a corresponding de-
crease in the relative proportion going to wages and
salaries—this in spite of a very considerable increase
in real wages, reckoned in terms of commodity buy-
ing power.7 These are both changes of the type
which characterizes the upward swings of the famil-
iar short cycle; but they have persisted through two
short cycles and the up-swing of a third, instead of
being fully cancelled by the down-swing of each
6Forcorporate earnings, see Economic Tendencies in the United
States, p. 482; for wages, ibid., pp. 478-9, and for number of workers,
ibid., p. 417. Cf. also King's The National Income and Its Purchasing
Power (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1930) pp. 196, 94, io8.
In King's figures, interest and dividends appear as a growing percentage
of the national income, but total entrepreneurial income realized by
individuals about holds its relative position.
7Mr.M. C. Rorty suggests that this movement represents a lagging
adjustment to a prior disturbance brought about by the changed price
level following the world War. In his view, interest and dividends were
less than a normal percentage of the national income in 1922,androse
to only a trifle above normal in 1929.Thequestion remains whether
this normal' represents a satisfactory state of long-run balance,
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successive short cycle. It is as if we had superimposed
on the three short cycles, one longer one whose up-
swing lasted from 1921 to 1929 and whose down-
swing would probably be found to coincide with
the unusually long and deep down-swing of the last
of the three short cycles. This last down-swing may
be found to have fully cancelled the effects of the
entire period '92 1-29, with respect to the relative
shares of income going to profits and to wages, wip-
ing out the gains made by profits in this period.
Thus this ten-year period 1922-32 resembles the
movements characterizing the shorter cycle in specu-
lation, construction, growth of capital equipment
and distribution of incomes. In two other factors
of prime importance the movements of this period
were far from characteristic of the shorter cyclical
movements. Prices remained approximately stable
but with a sagging tendency after 1925, culminating
in a catastrophic fall. This may be interpreted as a
long cycle superimposed on a downward secular
trend; but such an analysis may not carry convic-
tion. Nor is it wholly adequate to speak of it as a
delayed post-War deflation, so far as that implies a
return to what would have been normal had the
War not occurred. If that has happened, it can only
be by the merest chance, when the distribution of
the world's gold, national budgets and balances of
international trade and indebtedness are all racked
by the strains of the post-War 'settlements'.
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Employment
With respect to employment, the figures for total
factory employment for the ten-year period show
simply three cycles, with little or no upward trend
to match the growth of population. In the cases of
railroads, mining and agriculture, numbers attached
to these industries failed to keep pace with the
growth of population.8 Figures of actual unemploy-
ment are notoriously inadequate but if there was a
ten-year cycle, its upward swing carried with it no
clear decrease of unemployment, and possibly even
an increase. The seemingly abnormal increase of
capital equipment had not been employing many
more workers, and may even have been displacing
them, if allowance is made for the growth of popula-
tion. Thus the heavy cyclical fall in employment,
when it came, was all the more serious.
Durable Goods
Another feature of this ten-year period was a large
increase in the proportion of our income going into
durable goods, with all the consequences indicated
in the earlier parts of this study. These types of ex-
penditure are in a high degree optional, postpon-
able and subject to intensified fluctuations, both
because of the durability of the goods purchased and
because of the luxury or semi-luxury character of
8SeeKing, op. cit., pp. 56-7.
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fresh additions to the community's supply. For both
these reasons they represent types of goods in which
the forces which operate toward the beginnings of
a recovery might naturally be expected to be slower
in their action in proportion both to the durability
of the goods and to their luxury or semi-luxury
characterY Thus elements of added sensitiveness
have apparently been introduced into our economic
system. This point will be developed in Part IV,
dealing with this last cycle.
Conclusion
It is easier to record the changes occurring in
such a period than to interpret their meaning. What
are their causes? Are they the natural results of grow-
ing economic power, or only the natural results
under certain conditions, for instance, of credit in-
stitutions and the distribution of incomes? Do they
represent a state of balance or 'moving equilibrium'
in the general sense of equality between supply and
demand, adequate and unhampered use of existing
productive powers and no obstacles to their future
development and use? Or do they represent malad-
justments in this large, but still limited, sense?
In dealing with the typical patterns of the short
cycles, the rationale of different specific features was
0Theimportance of the increase of luxury goods, demand for which
is highly sensitive, has been stressed by Mr. M. C. Rorty; see "How
May Business Revival Be Forced?" Harvard Business Review Supple-
ment, April, 1932,pp.385-98.
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examined as each came up for discussion. The nature
of these longer swings is such an organic whole that
this method seems hardly applicable; and the prob-
lem can better be treated as a unit. This will be
attempted in Part VI, against the background of a
study of the basic conditions of moving equilibrium
in a growing society. An attempt will be made to
judge at least tentatively the nature and meaning
of the post-War movements.
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